Meno 2

The Meno, Part II

I. The Hypothetical Argument (Meno 86d - 96e)

The hypothetical argument takes a certain statement as an assumption and attempts to analyze it. The hypothesis is one that links virtue to knowledge and infers from this that virtue can be taught: If virtue is knowledge, then it can be taught. Socrates bases this on the assumption that knowledge is something that can be taught. Thus, if virtue is knowledge and knowledge is something that can be taught, then virtue also can be taught.

A. Reasons for Thinking that Virtue is Knowledge (Meno 87c-89a)

Virtue is what makes us good, and the good is advantageous, but various spiritual qualities (typically associated with virtue in someway) are only advantageous if wisdom or knowledge accompanies them. For instance, courage and temperance are not virtuous in themselves, since they can easily lead to disadvantage. They are only advantageous when guided to right action, and this requires wisdom. Hence, virtue must be knowledge, in part or in whole. This conclusion can now be incorporated into a larger argument using the conditional or hypothetical statement above.

We can represent Socrates' argument here as follows.

(P1) If virtue is knowledge, then it can be taught. (conditional premise)

(P2) Virtue is knowledge. (affirming the antecedent of the conditional)

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The argument is valid since the conclusion follows by logical necessity from the premises. If the premises are both true, then the conclusion cannot be false. This is just the definition of validity in logic. (An argument that is valid and also has premises that are in fact true is called sound.) The argument form in question is called modus ponens. It will always be valid regardless of what statements or content one places in the argument, though for every valid argument the question will remain as to whether the premises are true. But we have seen above why Socrates thinks (P1) and (P2) are true.

B. Reasons for Thinking that Virtue is not Knowledge (89c-96e)

However, after presenting the previous line of reasoning, Socrates develops reasons for supposing that virtue cannot be taught. Socrates argues that if virtue can be taught, then there would be teachers of virtue. However, there appear not to be any teachers of virtue. The children of various virtuous men (e.g., Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, and Thucydides) are examined, and Socrates argues that though the parents were virtuous the kids were not virtuous. But the parents desired to teach them virtue, and the kids were quite skilled in many other matters that they had been taught by their parents. Moreover, if even we suppose that there was a teaching flaw in the parents, we would still have another problem. Some of the children of virtuous people are sent to schools and to study under men who are supposed to be teachers. The sophists, for instance, are supposed to be teachers of virtue, but they apparently cannot pass it on to others and they themselves do not seem to understand virtue. Socrates concludes from all of this that virtue cannot be taught.

If Socrates is correct about this, it yields a different sort of argument based on the same conditional premise as used in the above argument.

(P1) If virtue is knowledge, then it can be taught. (conditional premise)

(P2) Virtue cannot be taught. (denying the consequent of the conditional)

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This argument form is also valid, though it differs from the one above. It is called modus tollens. Here the second premise denies the consequent of the conditional, yielding as a conclusion a denial of the antecedent. Notice that this argument contradicts the previous one. So we have reached conflicting conclusions. How is it, then, that people become good or virtuous?

Note: In Meno 89a-89b we have Socrates eliminating the possibility that virtue is by nature on two grounds. First, if it were knowledge, then it would not be by nature for knowledge is acquired. Of course, Socrates eliminates this possibility when he argues that it isn't taught. Secondly, if it were by nature, he argues that there would be experts among the Greeks who would recognize the naturally good at an earlier age. But this is not the case. This argument obviously does not depend on virtue being knowledge. Another possibility to rule out that virtue is by nature is that good people do not always have good children, so they obviously don't inherit goodness.

So it looks like virtue will not be inherited or by nature on several grounds. And if it can't be taught, the natural question to ask is how a person gets to be virtuous.

II. The Distinction between True Belief and Knowledge (Meno 97a-99a)

Socrates realizes that the earlier argument for virtue being knowledge was based on a false assumption, namely that the various spiritual qualities discussed could be put to right use only if accompanied by wisdom. If one had wisdom, then surely one would be able to use such qualities to one's advantage, but knowledge or wisdom is not the only way to do this. Socrates argues that true belief itself would be sufficient to achieve the same practical results, but it is not the same as knowledge.

True belief is an opinion that happens to be correct, perhaps by chance. Knowledge, he says, is a true belief for which one has a reason, grounds, explanation, or argument, and presumably good ones. It is a " adequately thought through" true belief, which as the result of being adequately thought through has a basis. It is getting it right (correct) for the right (correct) reason. It is "tied down" true belief.

Both knowledge and mere true belief are equally useful at the time one has them. As Socrates says, both a true belief and knowledge about how to get to Larissa (or any destination) will get one there. (Meno, 97a-97b). So they are both practically advantageous. Nonetheless, knowledge is valued more than true belief. Because knowledge is a true belief that is tied down by argument or reasoning, it is not likely to leave one. It is stable. Thus, knowledge will more consistently lead one to useful action through time than a mere true belief. True belief is only a guide to right action for the moment that one is fortunate enough to have the true belief.

III. Virtue as Originating from a Divine Dispensation (99b-100b)

It follows from this distinction that those men who have been leading and governing are not necessarily wise men. They did not get the way they are by being taught by others. They happen to believe what is true and thus happen to be useful. But they are much like the prophets through whom the gods speak. They have acquired their true beliefs, not being taught or by nature, but it comes from the gods. Hence, the person who is virtuous gets this as a gift, a divine dispensation.

Socrates states that true belief (as well as knowledge) are acquired, not inherited. So his reasoning here will support the idea that virtue is not acquired by teaching, nor is it something by nature. It is acquired, but as a divine gift.

It also follows, of course, that since those who govern well do so only because of true belief that there is not a guarantee that they will be successful in maintaining the social order. Whether this is meant as a criticism of their authority or governing ability or to place everyone at the mercy of the gods, Socrates is emphasizing that common assumptions about the wisdom of the leaders has been inferred invalidly from their practical success. Practical success does not necessarily mean that one is wise.

IV. The Conclusion

Socrates says that however gets virtue gets it by a divine dispensation, unless he is such a person as to be able to make others like himself (i.e., by being able to teach virtue to others). He will be like "a solid reality among shadows." (Cf. to Allegory of the Cave)

Socrates says that though he and Meno have concluded that virtue cannot be taught but comes by way of divine dispensation, they will not know the whole truth of the matter or understand it properly until they determine what virtue is, a question which has proved elusive throughout the dialogue. Socrates says that in the meantime, Meno should depart and try to persuade others like Anytus of the things he now believes are true. The Athenians may have cause to thank him. (Why? Because he will make them better than they are at the moment? Because the future success of Athens depends on the citizens coming to recognize these truths that Socrates and Meno have discovered along the way of their inquiry after the nature of virtue? Because they will not be fooled by the trickery of the Sophists? Several possibilities).

Although Socrates and Meno never answer the question regarding the nature of virtue, they do eliminate certain possibilities. In eliminating these possibilities, new possibilities emerge (e.g., that there are more than just two possibilities for how we acquire virtue). The emergence of these new possibilities and unexpected insights along the way are like moments on the pathway in the Allegory of the Cave. Perhaps one's intellectual freedom begins when one recognizes one's own ignorance. Here the shackles fall and it is possible to move forward. Until then, we see only shadows. Our perspectives are not only narrow, but far removed from reality.

Since Socrates has argued the knowledge is true belief that has been tied down through reasoning, one clear message of the dialogue is that "dialogue" is necessary in the search for knowledge. As the dialogue between Meno and Socrates shows, only by engaging in dialogue are we confronted with the questions that push us closer to what is real. Socrates believed that we become enlightened not by lecture or having the truth told to us, but by being actively involved in a small group of willing participants who work together and hammer out issues by posing questions, drawing out the implications of beliefs, challenging them, and reflecting on them. Hence, a crucial question and indication of intellectual progress becomes the extent to which we have overcome the various obstacles to genuine dialogue. If one achieves this, one has perhaps taken a few big steps closer to the exit of the cave.

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Further food for thought: The word "Meno" means "to remain," "stand still," or "be without motion or movement." If Meno has made intellectual progress, he has changed in some way. With every change in perspective comes a change in self. But is it also possible that there must first be certain changes within us, e.g., our character or desires, which are preconditions for change in perspective? If so, then the possibility of genuine dialogue may very well depend on the sort of people we are. The natural question to ask then is this: what sort of people must we be for genuine dialogue to happen.