HIS 102 Western Civilization 2 sec 500
Al Qaeda’s goal always has been to unify the Islamic world under an Islamic government—to
create, in effect, an Islamic empire that is ready to both protect the interests of the Islamic
world and to expand Islamic influence. It is doubtful that al Qaeda will achieve this goal. Indeed,
it is Stratfor’s view that al Qaeda’s actions will, contrary to its intentions or expectations,
generate the exact opposite effect -- the creation of an American empire.
In a sense, the American empire already was created by the nearly simultaneous fall of the Soviet
Union and the Japanese economy. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States became the only
power capable of projecting military force globally. With the crash of Japan’s economy and the
extraordinary expansion of the American economy in the 1990s, the United States also became the
dominant global economic power, the primary source of capital and innovation. These two forces
combined to give the United States overwhelming political power and with that came the ability to
shape the international order as it wished.
American power did not match the American appetite for power. The U.S. did not perceive itself as
having major global interests and its economy was less dependent on either imports or exports than
were those of other major powers. Nevertheless, the United States had an interest in maintaining the
stability of the international economic order. In general, this meant maintaining and expanding
market capitalism in other countries and developing an international free trade regime with the
inevitable protectionist aspects that domestic American politics had come to require.
On another level, the United States, no longer riveted by any serious threats to its national
security, had the luxury to focus on the moral character of regimes. It intervened in Somalia to end
appalling hunger; in Haiti to put a stop to a brutal and repressive regime; in Bosnia and Kosovo to
limit Serbian excesses. All of these were elective operations. The United States did not undertake
these missions because it had any overriding interests at stake, but because it had a massive
surplus in politico-military power and could afford to indulge. When Somalia proved more complex and
painful than the United States was prepared to endure, it withdrew. When the Haitian operation
failed to provide the promised blessings, the government changed its focus.
The central reality of the 1990s was this: while the United States had the ability to impose a
global order, it clearly did not need one and the cost of imposing one outstripped any benefit that
the United States might derive from it. Although the U.S. was clearly the world’s leader in every
sense, and even thought of itself as the leader, it did not wish to take on the disciplines of
leadership or assume the cost of forming a global order. Leadership includes developing coherent
principles for governing the international system, deploying the power to impose that system and the
willingness to create appropriate institutions with which to govern.
The lack of American appetite for power in the 1990s resulted in a subsequent lack of any
predictable, coherent behavior in the international system. Instead, Washington's principles were
vague, its political and military power was diffuse and the institutions it chose to operate through
(namely the United Nations and NATO) were both relics of the Cold War and were fundamentally
unsuited to the tasks at hand.
Nothing is more dangerous than power without appetite or fear. Appetite and fear focus power, make
it predictable and make it possible for other nations to craft policies that accommodate, avoid or
resist that power. Where there is neither appetite nor fear, power is unfocused and therefore
inherently unpredictable. That unpredictability was the mark of U.S. policy between the fall of the
Berlin Wall and Sept. 11.
For most of the rest of the world, the 1990s was like living with a huge gorilla whose intentions
were generally good if somewhat addled. It was impossible to predict what the gorilla might become
interested in next, what it might do and the consequences of its actions. For other nations, the
United States potentially could be the solution to their problems, but, if unfocused, also could be
dangerous.
Other countries therefore had two predominant goals. One was to try to take advantage of a
relationship with the United States. The other was to try to form coalitions large enough to focus
the U.S. or at least render it predictable to some degree. The latter was difficult. Working with
the United States was more profitable than resisting it. Thus every time a coalition started to
form, the U.S. government would shift its policy slightly, perhaps seducing one of the potential
coalition members, and the effort would collapse.
The rest of the world did not find this situation amusing. U.S. power and indifference posed a
threat to their national interest. The problem did not derive from any defect in the American
character, but from geography and power. The United States was physically secure from the rest of
the world and so powerful and prosperous that it needed little from that world. American
self-sufficiency and the power to secure what little it needed collided with the very different
experience of the rest of the world.
Nowhere was this clearer than in Somalia. The United States, under former President George Bush,
intervened for humanitarian reasons, stayed to try to build a nation, then pulled out when the
nationals resisted. From the American point of view, this was a humanitarian mission that just didn’t
work out.
From the standpoint of the Islamic world -- and particularly that of al Qaeda’s founders -- this
was an example of the random and unpredictable nature of U.S. foreign policy, coupled with a lack of
moral fiber. Washington’s actions may have been well intended, but were perceived as an
unwarranted, imperial intervention. Worse, the intervention was perceived as an imperial move by a
nation with no appetite for empire.
Somalia led directly to Sept. 11. Al Qaeda was part of the international community that found U.S.
behavior erratic, unpredictable and ultimately weak. Al Qaeda’s goal -- building an Islamic empire
-- required that it challenge the U.S. and demonstrate that the United States was both inherently
weak due to moral corruption and that it would be incapable of destroying al Qaeda. For al Qaeda,
challenging the United States would change the psychology of the Islamic world, thereby undermining
the perceived power of the United States.
Sept. 11 redefined the world for the United States. It turned the world from a vaguely irrelevant,
generally harmless place in which there were economic opportunities and the chance to do good deeds
into one that was deadly. It also created a focus for U.S. power that changed the dynamic of the
entire international system. Prior to Sept. 11, the United States had only a vague interest in the
international system; after the attacks this international system -- and the destruction of al
Qaeda, to be precise -- became an obsession.
The problem for the United States, however, is that destroying al Qaeda is not a straightforward
action. The group has dispersed itself globally, which forces the United States to follow suit.
Prior to Sept. 11, the United States completely dominated the world’s oceans and space. This
allowed it to go anywhere and see everything, but its ground forces were deployed fairly randomly.
For example, thousands of troops were still deployed in Germany, more from habit than from need. The
U.S. presence in Eurasia was essentially without a mission and not particularly deep.
Over the past 10 months, the United States has not only dispersed its forces throughout Eurasia and
the surrounding islands, but also has moved deeply into the governments, intelligence agencies and
security apparatus of many of these countries. U.S. forces have been deployed, in small numbers, to
areas ranging from Europe and Georgia to the "stans" and the Philippines. More important,
in many of these countries small numbers of U.S. forces are "advising" (i.e. commanding)
native forces while U.S. advisors monitor and influence decisions from the these countries’
Ministries.
Sept. 11 created an unintended momentum in U.S. foreign policy that has led directly to
empire-building. Empires are not created by salivating monsters seeking power. Such empires usually
fail. The Romans did not intend to build an empire, but each step they took logically led to the
next and in due course they had an empire. In turn, being an empire profoundly changed their
institutions and their self-definition. Aside from a deep belief in their own virtue, becoming an
empire was not an intention but an outcome.
The United States does not intend to become an empire. Its birth was the first great anti-imperial
exercise. It certainly has little economic need for empire because, like the British, it can trade
for what it needs. But the logic of empire does not consist of avarice nearly as much as fear. The
Romans’ first impulse to empire was defensive. So, too, the American impulse is entirely
defensive. The United States is not trying to build an empire: It simply wants to stop al Qaeda.
However, to do so is to follow the classic imperial process.
Driven by the need to defeat al Qaeda, American forces are deploying to scores of countries around
the world -- sometimes overtly, sometimes secretly; sometimes in uniform and sometimes as secret
agents. In all of these countries, the United States is engaged in reshaping domestic policies. Al
Qaeda cannot be rooted out unless the social fabric of these countries can be managed.
Few will dare resist. The United States is enormously powerful and has been transformed from a
vaguely disinterested gorilla into a brutally focused and deadly viper, ready to strike anywhere.
Given U.S. power and the American mood, few nations are prepared to risk U.S. displeasure by
refusing to cooperate in the fight against al Qaeda. Indeed, many see it as a chance to profit from
collaboration with Washington.
In practice this means that, in the course of defeating al Qaeda the United States is becoming an
integral part of the domestic policy process and implementation in virtually all countries around
the globe. Those that resist are potential targets for American attack. This was an inevitable --
but unintended – consequence of the attacks of Sept. 11.
The intention is to defeat al Qaeda; the means to do so is a global war against them. This requires
the United States to be present in a majority of countries, overseeing processes that are part of a
sovereign nation’s purview, therefore, in effect, usurping its sovereignty. Since the war itself
requires reconstructing social orders, the American presence will have to intrude deeply into these
societies. Since the war against al Qaeda could take a generation, the U.S. will be there for a long
time.
Most American policymakers would deny that this is their intention. All would be sincere, but the
unintended consequence is the nature of politics. In this case, the unintended consequence is
empire. U.S. power, having met an obsessive need, is moving throughout the world. Where it meets
resistance, it has no choice but to plan war. The United States can neither decline combat with al
Qaeda nor avoid the consequences of such combat.
The United States has been a democratic republic, an anti-imperial power. Now it is an imperial
power, not in the simplistic Leninist sense of seeking markets, but in the classical sense of being
unable to secure its safety without controlling others. The paradox is that al Qaeda -- ultimately a
very minor power -- is driving the world's greatest nation toward this end.
The problem, of course, is that all of this is visible tactically to Americans. They see the
deployments into each country. They see the acceptance of advisors into ministries. They have come
to expect cooperation by police in Yemen, bases in Kyrgyzstan, information from Egypt and
accommodation from Germans or Russians. They expect it, but have not yet constructed a coherent
picture or named what they are getting into: empire. Empires begin not with rabid manifestoes, but
with short-term solutions leading only one way.
The dispersal we see today will last at least as long as the Cold War dispersals, and will be even
harder to abandon. There will be resistance to an American empire, from great powers as well as
small. There will be burdens to be borne in holding this empire that cannot be abandoned. The
American dilemma is that it is better at winning an empire than explaining it or even admitting what
has happened.
The United States is taking control of countries throughout the world, bringing benefits and making
threats. But the United States has no theory of empire. How can a democratic republic and an empire
coincide? Once, this was an interesting theoretical question. Now it is the burning -- but
undiscussed -- question in American politics.
The issue is not whether this should happen. It is happening. The real issue, apart from how all
this plays out, is what effect it will have on the United States as a whole. A global empire whose
center is unsure of its identity, its purposes and its moral justification is an empire with a
center that might not hold. As the obvious becomes apparent, this will become the focus of a
pressing debate in the United States.