Davos, Multilateralism and the Crisis of the Alliance
Jan 29, 2003 stratfor.biz Dr. George Friedman

Summary

"Multilateralism" was the main theme at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, recently concluded in Davos. For European states, the first half of the 20th century was a time of unprecedented savagery. In European minds, the culprit was nationalism -- or, more precisely, the unilateral pursuit of national interest. Multilateralism -- the creation of multinational institutions and a multinational mode of thought -- is the Europeans' response to their history. It has become a moral category. The United States, however, has a very different history and a very different set of fears. The United States has no historical reason for fearing its own nationalism, but it does have reason to fear inaction. The U.S. need to deal with Islamic radicalism collides with the European fear that the shattering of multilateralism once again will release the demons of nationalism.

Analysis

Stratfor was present at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, during the week of Jan. 23. The meeting was fascinating, but not necessarily for the reasons the organizers intended. At Davos, you could hear history creaking in the woodwork -- the strains of the old international systems beginning to splinter under the weight of new realities. It was a meeting in which many participants expressed substantial anger at the United States and fear of the future, particularly over the coming war with Iraq. Underlying all of this, however, was the belief that ultimately there was nothing broken that could not be repaired.

Those present at Davos were far from representative of the world or even of the world's elite. The World Economic Forum is an organization comprising business leaders who head the major global organizations. But many others attend the annual conference: Senior government leaders -- including several heads of state from each continent; armies of ministers, assistant ministers and minor non-ministers; officials from multinational organizations like the World Bank and United Nations; leaders of various non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty International; and representatives from think-tanks. Finally, there are hordes of prestigious academics.

This does not necessarily mean a vast divergence of opinions. The World Economic Forum has an embedded ideology, developed in the 1980s and forged in the1990s. The organization believes that the business community, united and combined with these other constituencies, can dramatically improve the human condition through good will and good policies. Rising to its heights during the 1990s, it held that economics had superceded geopolitics as the driver of human events. At root, most of its members either still believe this or wish this were true. At the recent conference, it was not just the United States that was resented -- the real resentment was at the betrayal by history, and an underlying commitment to reversing that process.

What was present was that segment of the international elite that is committed to preserving the international system as it was prior to Sept. 11, 2001. The world view at Davos was of those who remain committed to the world and the alliances founded by American power after World War II -- and adopted by much of the rest of the world since then. Resistance to the idea that this world now could be defunct was intense, as much among the American representatives as among the rest of the world. It was a meeting in which two concepts, never expressed clearly but always present, dominated: Preserve what is; restore what has been lost.

The NGOs and the think-tanks, combined with the multinational organizations, form the intellectual center of gravity at Davos. Combined with representatives of the European Union, they constitute a powerful phalanx of thought. They are strongly supported by most of the academics present, including those from the United States. Other blocs are present. The Asians spent their time thinking about economics, trying to drive away thoughts of international conflict. The Asians also wistfully recalled their former days of glory -- assuring everyone that the glory lives on in China, and hoping that no one posed any serious security or geopolitical questions to them. Muslim leaders, seeking to block U.S. adventures in Iraq, aligned with the Europeans, although their mindset was far from that of Brussels on most issues.

The main thrust of the conference can be summed up in one term: multilateralism. Multilateralism, in the context of Davos, is an attack on the legitimacy of the United States in exercising sovereign national rights outside the framework of international institutions. The U.N., International Monetary Fund, EU and various multinational NGOs are multilateral organizations. This means two things: First, they are the creations of more than one nation; second, their mission is to bridge the gap between nations, thereby reducing conflict. There is an ethical imperative here. The view is that nationalism is the problem that drove the world to catastrophe in two world wars -- and that multinational organizations are more than simply useful contrivances that serve the interests of various nations; they are moral enterprises whose very existence helps save the world from conflict.

This is very much the European view, and it is understandable. European nationalism led the Continent and the world into unprecedented exercises of barbarism throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The Europeans, deeply traumatized by the horror that clearly ran just beneath the surface of their civilization and which they no longer could deny, grabbed hold of the U.S.-inspired system of multinational relations and expanded on it for two reasons. One was the explicit mission (such as economic development), and the second was the moral mission, which was to limit the autonomy of European nations in order to prevent another outbreak of European nationalism. NATO and the EU were useful as ends in themselves, but their deepest purpose was to prevent the outbreak of another Franco-German war by tying the two nations together in a single network of relations.

For European leaders, multilateralism is a moral category, designed to restrain the brutal consequences of nationalism. In the distrust of national ambition and their a priori commitment to entities like the IMF, World Bank and multiple U.N. agencies -- as well as purely European contrivances -- the Europeans are joined by the functionaries of international humanitarian and human rights NGOs, as well as diplomats and public officials of many countries -- especially European -- for whom the rhetoric of multinationalism and multilateralism has become the common currency of public discourse.

The United States has a very different experience of nationalism and therefore a very different view of multilateralism. From the U.S. point of view, World Wars I and II were exercises in European savagery; it fell to the United States to save Europe from itself. However, the United States never saw itself as responsible for Europe's disease, nor did it see itself as susceptible to it. Washington was not afraid of its own nationalist tendencies. Americans believed that the Europeans would not behave as civilized human beings unless they were forced into institutions that limited their sovereignty and behavior. In the American view, the lesson of the 20th century was precisely the opposite: The United States could be trusted to behave responsibly without institutional constraints. During the Cold War, an American might argue, nuclear holocaust was prevented precisely because the United States unilaterally managed its nuclear strategy. Had the European statesmen of 1914 or 1939 had nuclear weapons, or had the weapons been held multilaterally, another holocaust might have followed.

From the U.S. viewpoint, it is altogether reasonable that the Europeans demand multilateralism for themselves. It is not reasonable to demand it of the United States. The current alliance structure has two purposes: One is to facilitate the effective defense of the West, the other is to create a framework for controlling European excesses. The alliance now is hindering rather than facilitating defense and, one would hope, the Europeans are now sufficiently chastened and mature to restrain themselves within their own multilateral systems. NATO's consensus system should not be permitted to impede U.S. war-making strategy, particularly when it permits countries that commit and risk little or nothing to control the United States, which is committing and risking much. From Washington's perspective, NATO might have outlived its usefulness.

At Davos, Secretary of State Colin Powell made the argument for the United States, although he left much unsaid. In general, the U.S. academic and NGO attendees sided with the Europeans, while the business leaders maintained a muted tone, focusing on the effects a war might have on the economy. There is a self-selection process at Davos that results in a certain stratum of U.S. views being represented while others are not. But it was more interesting than that. There was continual talk about European opposition to U.S. "unilateralism," but the Europeans were deeply split as well. The Spanish government has come in on Washington's position, and the Italian government is close. Most of Eastern Europe is siding with the United States. And of course the British government stands with the United States. Germany and France do not speak for Europe; they speak for themselves in a deeply divided Europe. The divisions within Europe did not come through clearly.

In a sense, that's reasonable. Many Americans oppose President George W. Bush's policies, and many Europeans oppose the Franco-German position. But this is more than a question of public opinion at any given period. The fact is that, at the deepest intellectual and moral level, a divide is opening between Europe and the United States. And with that gap, the entire edifice of the post-War alliance structure is cracking apart.

From a practical point of view, we can already see the shifting alliances. What Turkey or Saudi Arabia or India do has a direct, potential effect on the United States. What Germany or France do really doesn't matter that much in a practical sense. Geography defines interests, and the geography of Europe has little to do with contemporary U.S. interests and fears in 2003. The Fulda Gap is infinitely less important than the Shatt al-Arab to the United States. History has turned, and the incomprehension and anger of the Europeans at Davos is directed less at the United States than at a lack of ability to control events.