Ecuador's Economic Growth Obscures Coming Problems
11 June 2002
Summary
Despite economic benefits from adopting the U.S. dollar in 2000, Ecuador could
soon find itself with the same problems Argentina is facing. A dispute over how
revenues from a new oil pipeline should be spent also could block $240 million
in funds from the International Monetary Fund.
Analysis
Ecuador is enjoying the front-end benefits of adopting the U.S. dollar as its
national currency in January 2000. The country has one of the fastest-growing
economies in Latin America today, interest rates and inflation have dropped
dramatically and demand is soaring for new mortgage and automobile loans.
According to Ecuador's Central Bank projections, a consumption boom is under way
and even better times lie ahead, with the country's yearly economic growth
expected to average at least 7 percent from 2003 to 2006 as a new $1.1 billion
pipeline roughly doubles the country's oil exports. However, Ecuador's recent
robust economic recovery rests on shaky foundations that likely will not be
strengthened in the coming months as the country's political leaders and
organizations focus on the October 2002 national elections.
When it adopted the U.S. dollar as its national currency, Ecuador lost the power
and flexibility to fuel the economy by printing more currency or making exports
more competitive by devaluing the currency. In fact, despite the economy's rosy
outlook, the country easily could follow Argentina's path to default,
devaluation and political turmoil in two or three years if its political leaders
don't expedite critical reforms. These are needed to control public spending and
boost Ecuador's competitiveness and productivity in key export industries like
textiles, bananas, shrimp, flowers and petroleum.
The International Monetary Fund has deep concerns about Ecuador's overall fiscal
outlook over the medium term, IMF spokesman Thomas Dawson said June 6 in
Washington, D.C. These concerns likely are justified, given the track record of
Ecuador's political leadership over the past decade of blocking or delaying key
structural reforms that the country needs to reduce under-development and
poverty.
In fact, Ecuador's adoption of the U.S. dollar in early 2000 was a desperate
attempt by then-President Jamil Mahuad to avoid economic collapse and
hyperinflation caused by years of poor government and bitter congressional
resistance to reforms. However, his decision to do so triggered a short-lived
military- and indigenous-led coup that toppled him and brought current President
Gustavo Noboa to power.
The IMF, which is negotiating a $240 million aid program with Noboa's
government, wants all of the future fiscal revenues from the new oil pipeline to
be used in paying down the government's $14 billion foreign debt, which is
equivalent to about 68 percent of Ecuador's projected gross domestic product in
2002. Of this total, about 52 percent is owed to private banks, 30 percent to
multilateral lending entities and 18 percent to wealthy countries in the Paris
Club group of creditor nations.
Specifically, the fund wants the government to commit 80 percent of its fiscal
revenues from the pipeline to paying down its foreign debt, and put the
remaining 20 percent in a rainy day fund that would be used to stay current on
debt payments when oil prices fall in the future.
However, the Fiscal Responsibility, Stabilization and Transparency Law approved
May 22 by Ecuador's Congress did not satisfy the IMF's preconditions for a new
aid program, since it earmarked 70 percent of the pipeline's fiscal revenues to
paying down the public sector debt and put 10 percent aside for social spending
programs. Fund officials have indicated that if Congress does not reform this
new law to eliminate the social spending category, the IMF likely will not
approve the $240 million bridge loan the Noboa government is seeking to narrow
its fiscal deficit this year.
With the price of Ecuador's oil exports averaging $25 a barrel compared to the
fiscal 2002 budget's estimate of $19 a barrel, and with tax revenues running 20
percent higher than was originally budgeted for this year, it's possible that
Noboa's government may follow the politically easier course of borrowing against
future oil revenues to paper over the fiscal hole before a new president takes
power in early 2003.