U.S. Builds Proliferation Case Against Pakistan
Apr 01, 2003

Summary

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has called U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to seek clarification on new sanctions that were levied against a Pakistani nuclear research institute, which is accused of buying North Korean No Dong missiles and selling nuclear technology to Pyongyang. Details of the accusation made by a "senior" U.S. administration official, cited by the Washington Times on March 31, have technical inconsistencies, however. Given the timing of the sanctions, it appears elements of the Bush administration are trying to paint Pakistan and North Korea with the same brush -- laying the groundwork for potential action against both nations in the post-Iraq war era.

Analysis

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has called U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell after word emerged that the United States has levied sanctions against Pakistan's Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL). The sanctions were triggered by the alleged transfer of nuclear technology to North Korea and also are related to the alleged purchase of three to six complete North Korean No Dong ballistic missiles. Pakistan has denied both charges.

The accusation that Pakistan traded nuclear technology for missiles is not new: Allegations were widely published in October 2002, after North Korea allegedly admitted to having a uranium enrichment program. At that time, Washington refrained from implementing new sanctions, noting that the alleged transfers took place in 1997 -- before Musharraf took power. However, it now appears that elements in the Bush administration feel the time has come to turn up the pressure on Islamabad and are portraying Pakistan in the same light as North Korea -- potentially setting up both nations to face the full force of Washington's nonproliferation efforts after the war in Iraq.

A March 31 report by the Washington Times gave specific details of KRL's alleged No Dong purchase -- information drawn from "a senior [U.S.] administration official." According to the report, KRL purchased between three and six No Dongs, "fully assembled and ready to fly." These were transported to Pakistan in "American-made C-130 aircraft." While the initial message is clear -- Pakistan is using U.S.-supplied military equipment to buy North Korean missiles and support the regime in Pyongyang -- the details raise questions.

The No Dong, a North Korean modification of the SCUD missile, is 52.5 feet long and weighs 35,750 pounds. The maximum cargo capacity for a C-130E/H, which is in service in Pakistan, is 36,000 pounds, but the length of the cargo bay is just 41 feet long. In other words, either the missile was hanging out the back of the aircraft like a Christmas tree from a car trunk, the Washington Times was exaggerating when it reported the missiles were "fully assembled and ready to fly," or the initial leak was bogus or misinformed.

Either way, the accusation has been made, and Pakistan is responding. Further, the deliveries allegedly were made up to August 2002, thus removing the cloak of noncomplicity that Musharraf enjoyed when the initial accusations were made in October. And, by linking the missiles-for-nuclear technology deal to C-130 flights, it would appear that there is a subtle jab at China as well, unless the planes flew the circuitous route from North Korea around Indochina and India.

The timing is particularly troubling for the Musharraf government, which faces growing public demonstrations by opposition Islamist parties that seek an end to Pakistani cooperation with the U.S. military over the war in Iraq. Islamabad has found itself issuing repeated denials that Washington will set its sights on Pakistan after it finishes with Iraq, but the new sanctions are only bolstering those rumors.

Though in reality the sanctions themselves do little -- KRL does not trade with U.S. companies anyway -- the political impact is already being felt. And by raising the issue of Pakistani participation in North Korea's nuclear program both directly and through arms purchases, it is evident that there are at least some elements in the U.S. administration intent on ensuring that Pakistan is clearly linked to the North Korean issue.

With Pakistan already closely monitored for its possible role in harboring al Qaeda and Taliban members, there is an apparent movement in Washington to define the post-Iraq U.S. strategy as simultaneous confrontations with Pakistan and North Korea.