Introduction

Mead’s work directly responded to Cooley, but Mead’s analysis has been more influential for later interactionist developments. Charles Horton Cooley was the first to emphasize the social constitution of the self, the fact that the self is not intrinsically biological (for instance with reference to sex), but that biological conditions have to become relevant for the constitution of the self in a society. Cooley defines the self as "a somewhat definitive imagination of how one’s self... appears in a particular mind" (Human Nature and Social Order, 1902).

According to Cooley, the self is the capacity to see ourselves as we see other objects, as if we are looking into a mirror to find ourselves and see ourselves as others see us. This process of the looking-glass self can be broken down into three components: first, we imagine how we appear to others; second, we imagine others’ judgment of that appearance; and, third, we develop a self-feeling as the result of our imagining others’ judgments. The self, then, is first and foremost the result of a social process; there is no self without society (hence, most attention goes to the social influences on the self).

Mead’s analysis of the self departs from Cooley’s in two ways: a) Mead pays more attention to the process of how the self is constituted (through mind, cognition and language), and b) in the course of this explanation, Mead pays equal attention to the active ‘I’ and the passive ‘me’ side of the self (while Cooley’s self is largely me). Also, Mead, unlike some of his interactionist successors, was heavily influenced by psychological behaviorism; he sought to apply behaviorism to an analysis of consciousness, mind and self.
 

1. Mind

Mead’s analysis of mind, self, and society basically presents an outline of how social action is possible and what is so special about human (as compared to animal) action (Mind, Self & Society, 1934). This requires a few words of explanations on how he conceives mind and action.

First, consider an act. According to Mead, any act entails four stages: 1) impulse: a reaction to a stimulation in terms of the existing environment (I’m hungry); 2) perception: the incoming stimuli create mental images which permit to differentiate among the dimensions of an impulse (I see a dog and a chicken); 3) manipulation: appropriate action is considered in response to the perceived stimulus (the chicken looks quite tasty); and 4) action is taken (I eat the chicken).

Now, second, the human mind is according to Mead characterized by some unique features: the human mind is capable of using symbols to denote objects, to rehearse different types of action, and to imaginarily select the most appropriate line of action (the latter two are made possible by virtue of the symbols). This mind-ful use of symbols is called imaginate rehearsal, and this process is a necessary condition for the development of self and society. Indeed, because of the mind’s capacity to use significant symbols, as a basis for true communication, humans can transcend the simple pattern of action based on gestures. Gestures are used in any act involving two or more people (or animals), but only through the human mind can they acquire meanings which become common or shared among individuals in the course of their interactions with others. These are significant symbols, and they make up the essence of human communication through language. Thinking, then, can be defined as an internal conversation, and, since language is a social product, human thought or consciousness (and symbolic interaction) are possible only through the use of significant symbols (consciousness is social). Then, the mind can enter the important phase of being able to take the role of the other and constitute, through the interpretation of symbols, both self and society.

2. Self

Since communication is essential to the development of the self, it follows that Mead’s concept of the self is essentially a social self: "one has to be a member of a community to be a self". The self develops out of a conversation: by using symbols, one can talk to one’s self as if one talks to someone else. These symbols should arouse in oneself what it arouses in others (shared meanings). This is achieved through social interaction, i.e. in the course of life (from child to adulthood). Likewise, consciousness is social, it is a characteristic of the environment to which one belongs, it is not lodged in the brain.

Two stages can be distinguished in the development of self: 1) play, when the specific perspectives of a limited number of others is taken, and game, when several others’ particular perspectives lead to the formation of multiple self-images, and 2) the generalized other, when the overall, general perspective of the community of others (social norms, group) is assumed. The perspectives of others on oneself is then crystallized into a more or less coherent and stable conception of the self. Thus, in the form of the generalized other as the cognitive recognition of the attitudes of the community, the community exerts control over its members. The generalized other is not a part of the self; it is a capacity of the self to make signs universal.

The social determination of the self is not to deny subjectivity or individualism. Here fits in Mead’s important distinction between ‘I’ and ‘me’. First, the process of the formation of the self is not to be conceived mechanistically: the individual mind, the human capacity to take the role of the other through symbolic communication, is cognitively involved in the process to the self. Second, the self entails both the I and the me. This can be clarified by reference to memory: what the I does now is remembered the next moment as the me.

More important is the definition of I and me by reference to the social dimensions of the self. The me, the self as object, is the organized set of attitudes of others which oneself has assumed, it is the definite organization of the community in one’s own attitudes, as a moral, not a mechanistic, necessity; the me is conventional. The I, the self as subject, is how one reacts to these attitudes; it is uncertain, it gives the sense of freedom and initiative; the I represents novelty in action. The self therefore is conceived as a social process consisting of these two phases.

While the self is socially constructed, this does not mean, according to Mead, that the individual cannot affect the social community. On the one hand, Mead emphasizes that when one is engrossed in action, there is no sense of the self. One has to be more reflective in light of others to "have" a self (socially constructed). There cannot be a self without society. On the other hand, however, Mead also asserts that the individual "is not only a citizen, a member of the community, but he is one who reacts to this community and in his reaction to it... changes it". The relative importance of I and me depend on the situation, and "The fact that all selves are constituted by or in terms of the social process... is not in the least incompatible with, or destructive of, the fact that every individual self has its own peculiar individuality, its own unique pattern; because each individual self within that process, while it reflects in its organized structure the behavior patterns of that process as a whole, does so from its own particular standpoint within that process". The result of the I’s relative powers over the me do not only result in a changing self (adaptation to the situation), but can also affect the social environment (e.g. the genius).

3. Society

For the formation of the self, Mead asserts, interaction with others is crucial. Society, then, is defined by Mead as the organized set of interactions among diverse individuals (interaction between selves and others). All individuals in a society occupy particular roles, and each of their roles is defined in relation to the role of others (roles come in pairs, e.g. father and child). Social interaction relies then on the ability of individuals to know the roles of others, i.e. the capacity of "taking the role of the other", and, in the course of these interactions, as mentioned before, the self can also acquire the capacity to take the role of the generalized other. Under the supervision of the generalized other, the I and the me can then negotiate: the I tries out different versions of the me. The generalized other also enables two parties in a conversation to understand one another, to share meanings, and to put themselves in the place of the other. The universal nature of signs, the fact that a sign does not refer to anything in particular, emerges from the generalized other, i.e. the ability of people to project themselves emphatically into the position of the other.

In sum, the self and society are in Mead’s view mutually constitutive: society is in flux and amenable to change because it is constructed out of the adjustive interactions among individuals, and, at the same time, society influences the formation of the self via the mind process of taking the role of the generalized other. Basically, Mead argues that society shapes the self, and that the self affects society, a simple but profound observation for the times. The person "must become socialized to become himself."

4. Note: Mead on Social Control

Mead writes: "Social control, as operating in terms of self-criticism, exerts itself so intimately and extensively over individual behavior or conduct... [because the individual takes] the attitude of other individuals, and the attitudes of the organized social group of which he and they are members, toward himself......; and thus, through self-criticism, social control over individual behavior or conduct operates by virtue of the social origin and basis of such criticism. That is to say, self-criticism is essentially social criticism, and behavior controlled by self-criticism is essentially behavior controlled socially. Hence social control, so far from tending to crush out the individual or to obliterate his self-conscious individuality, is, on the contrary, actually constitutive of and inextricably associated with that individuality".